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The understanding that another person’s belief can differ from reality and that behaviour
is guided by beliefs and not by reality reﬂects an important cornerstone in the develop-
ment of a Theory of Mind. The present event-related potential (ERP) study had two aims:
ﬁrst, to reveal ERPs that distinguish between false- and true-belief reasoning and second, to
investigate the neural changes in the development of false- and true-belief reasoning from
childhood to adulthood. True- and false-belief cartoon stories were presented to adults and
6–8-year-old children.Results revealed twowaveforms thatdifferentiatedbetween the two
conditions: a late positive complex (LPC) associated with the reorientation from external
stimuli to internal mental representations and a late anterior slow wave (LSW) associatednterior slow wave
ate positive complex
with stimulus-independent processing of internal mental representations, a process that
might be centrally involved in the decoupling mechanism. Additionally, we found develop-
mental effects at an ERP level. Children showed a more posterior localization of the LPC and
a broader frontal distribution of the LSW. The results may reﬂect developmental progress
in conceptualizing the mental domain and support the idea that the cortical mentalizing
network continues to develop even after children are able to master false beliefs.. Introduction
The ability to recognize and evaluate other people’s
ental states, such as desires, intentions and beliefs
nables a person tonavigate successfully through the social
orld and is referred to as Theory ofMind (ToM). An impor-
ant milestone in the development of a ToM is gaining the
bility to represent false beliefs: the understanding that a
erson’s belief can differ from reality.
A classical task for testing false-belief understanding is
he so-called unexpected transfer task, in which a char-
cter (e.g. Maxi) leaves an object in one location (e.g. the
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drawer) andwhileheor she isoutside the roomtheobject is
transferred to a new location (e.g. the cupboard) (Wimmer
and Perner, 1983). Whereas 3-year-olds typically fail this
task and claim that Maxi would look for the chocolate in
the cupboard, 4–5-year-olds understand that Maxi would
search in the drawer. This indicates that they understand
thatMaxi’s knowledge of theworld and the real state of the
world are different and that a person’s behaviour is gener-
ally guided by beliefs about the world and not by reality
(see Wellman et al., 2001 for a meta-analysis).
Although research has begun to study the neural under-
pinnings of the ability to attribute mental states to another
person and revealed that areas like the dorsal medial
frontal cortex and the right temporo-parietal junction are
associated with false-belief reasoning (Amodio and Frith,
2006; Carrington and Bailey, 2009; Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003; Sommer et al., 2007), until now, only few event-
related potential (ERP) studies have investigated mental
l Cognit68 J. Meinhardt et al. / Developmenta
state attribution (Liu et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2009a,b). ERP
studies provide useful information about the time course
of cognitive processes such as ToM reasoning. To date, only
one ERP study has speciﬁcally investigated false-belief rea-
soning (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000). This study contrasted
a verbal false-belief condition in which an object had to
be localized according to a person’s belief to a verbal
false photo condition in which an object had to be local-
ized according to a photo (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000). The
results revealed that false-belief reasoning was associated
with a late left anterior slowwave thatwasmorepositive in
the false-belief condition than in the false photo condition.
However, the meaning of the anterior slow wave for the
decoupling between mental states and reality is unclear
because the component was also found in studies that
have not speciﬁcally investigated false-belief reasoning.
Two ERP studies which investigated mental state judge-
ments (Liu et al., 2004, 2009b) revealed a late slow wave
divergence at left anterior sites but with a different polar-
ity. In these studies participants had tomakeeither a reality
judgement concerning the real state of affairs or a think
judgement concerning a cartoon character’s mental state
(false and true beliefs about a location of another charac-
ter). In contrast to reality judgements, think judgements
were associatedwith a late slowwave. In a recent study, Liu
et al. (2009a) found an anterior slow wave associated with
a condition in which certain beliefs must be attributed to a
character. Participants were presented with stories about
a mystery box that contained objects for a guessing game.
For example, they read about a girl who thinks the box con-
tains a special food and a boywho thinks the box contains a
different food. Then one of the two objects was presented
and the participants had to answer who of the two chil-
dren thought that this object was in the box. The anterior
late slowwavewasnot only associatedwith this “divergent
beliefs” condition, which does not require a decoupling of
mental states from reality, but also with judgements about
desires. However, results revealed a right posterior slow
wave that was speciﬁcally associated with belief judge-
ments.
Taken together, ERP studies consistently show that
judgements about the thinking of another person are
associated with a late anterior slow wave. However, the
signiﬁcance of the anterior slow wave for the decoupling
mechanism of false-belief understanding is not completely
understood.
Thus, the ﬁrst aim of the present study was to inves-
tigate the speciﬁcity of false-belief reasoning by using a
contrast that taps the core of false-belief understanding.
This can be achieved by comparing a condition in which a
person’smental state is independent of reality (false belief)
to a condition in which the person’s mental state does not
differ from reality (true belief) (Perner, 1991). The advan-
tage of a false-belief versus true belief comparison is that
both conditions require actionprediction or explanation. In
contrast, a comparisonbetweena false-belief conditionand
a false photo condition (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000) has the
disadvantage that the two conditions are different in their
representational demands.Whereas false beliefs require an
understanding that a person’smental representation of the
world differs from the present state of reality, the photoive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 67–76
represents the world at a speciﬁc point in time and it is
only necessary to know that the photo depicts reality at
that time, i.e. the false photo is not really false (Perner and
Leekam, 2008).
The second aim of the current study was to investigate
developmental changes of the electrophysiological corre-
lates of false- and true-belief reasoning. Behaviourally, an
explicit false-belief understanding develops around the
ages of 4–5 years (Wellman et al., 2001) and an implicit
understanding of false beliefs has recently been demon-
strated in infants (Baillargeon et al., 2010). To date, only
one ERP study has addressed the neural correlates of
mental state attribution in children. In accordance with
their previous study (Liu et al., 2004), Liu et al. (2009b)
compared a think judgement concerning a character’s
mental state (false and true beliefs about a location of
another character) with reality judgements by presenting
animated vignettes to 4–6-year-old children and adults.
In adults think judgements were associated with a left
frontal slow wave. The same waveform but with a slightly
more diffuse frontal scalp distribution was revealed in
children who successfully passed the belief tasks. In chil-
dren who did not pass the belief tasks a differentiation
between belief reasoning and reality judgments was not
found.
In the present study, we investigated developmental
changes in the neural underpinnings of false- and true-
belief reasoning.Wepresented anunexpected transfer task
to adults and to 6–8-year-old children, that is, an age group
who have begun to consistently represent false beliefs
in everyday life. By comparing behaviourally competent
children to adults, we are able to ensure that children
are comparable to adults at a performance level, allow-
ing interpretation of group differences at the neural level.
Moreover, a comparison between competent children and
adults can test the structural invariance hypothesis, i.e. is
there a specialized system of ToM processing in the brain
that underlies false-belief reasoning in children as well as
in adults who have much more experience with belief rea-
soning, or is there evidence for an increase in efﬁciency and
specialization.
Recent structural MRI studies have revealed that brain
areas associated with belief reasoning, e.g. the medial
frontal cortex and the temporal cortex, undergo consid-
erable development throughout childhood. They provided
evidence for age-related cortical thinning in brain regions
crucially implicated in belief reasoning (Gogtay et al., 2004;
Shaw et al., 2008; Sowell et al., 2003, 2004; Toga et al.,
2006)whichmay reﬂect the use-dependent selective elim-
ination of synapses (Huttenlocher and Dabholkar, 1997).
For example, Shaw et al. (2008) showed that some areas
such as the temporal and frontal cortex, which are also
involved in belief reasoning, followed a cubic-like develop-
mental trajectory. An increase in cortical thickness during
childhood is followed by cortical thinning which domi-
nates adolescence. These long-lasting structural changes
may be correlated with developmental progress in con-
ceptualizing the mental domain (Johnson and Munakata,
2005). This idea is supported by behavioural studies of
ToM development showing that children’s understanding
of themindundergoes important reorganization frommid-
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le childhood through adolescence. For example, during
he elementary school years, children become increasingly
ware of the mind as an active interpreter of information
Chandler and Lalonde, 1996). While children understand
hat beliefs can be false due tomisinformation, adolescents
egin to conceive of coherent systems of beliefs, such as
nterpretive frameworks.
In sum, the present study had two major aims. The ﬁrst
im was to investigate ERP components that differentiate
etween false- and true-belief reasoning. With respect to
revious ERP studies that investigated belief reasoning in
eneral (Liu et al., 2004, 2009a; Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000;
abbagh, 2004), we expect a late slow wave localized at
rontal sites that distinguish between false- and true-belief
easoning. Related to the results of fMRI studies that com-
ared false- and true-belief reasoning and found activity of
emporo-parietal areas associatedwith false-belief reason-
ng (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Sommer et al., 2007), we
xpect ERP components that differentiate between true-
nd false-belief reasoning and that are spatially or tem-
orally distinguishable from the anterior slow wave. The
econdaimwas to revealdevelopmental changes in theERP
omponents associated with true- and false-belief reason-
ng.Considering the structural changes thebrainundergoes
uring this time and in respect to functional neuroimag-
ng studies showing that social cognition tasks increase
ctivity in frontal areas during childhood (for reviews see
lakemore, 2008a,b; Johnson, 2001), we expect a more dif-
use recruitment of the frontal cortex in children compared
o adults.
. Methods
.1. Participants
Twenty-four students from the University of Munich
articipated in the study for either course credit points
r monetary compensation. Data from three adults were
xcluded from the analyses because of technical errors.
ourteen out of the remaining 21 participants included in
he ﬁnal sample (mean age=24.33 years; SD=5.40) were
emale. All adult participants were right handed and had
ormal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Thirty-four 6–8-year-old children participated in the
tudy. Data from 12 children were excluded because of
xcessive movement artifacts (eye- or body movements)
r technical errors during EEG recordings. This propor-
ion of loss is common in ERP studies with young children
DeBoer et al., 2004). The ﬁnal sample for analysis con-
isted of twenty-two 6–8-year-old children (13 girls, 9
oys;mean age=7.7 years, SD inmonths =10.1). According
o their parents’ accounts, all children were reported right
anded and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
hild participants were recruited from a list of parents
ho hadpreviously indicated an interest in participating in
evelopmental research. The children received monetary
ompensation for theirparticipation in theexperiment. The
xperimental methods had ethical approval from the insti-
utional ethics committee. Informed consent was obtained
rom all adult participants and from all children and their
arents.ive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 67–76 69
2.2. Stimuli
Non-verbal cartoon stories depicting a person acting on
the basis of correct (true belief) or incorrect (false belief)
representations of reality (Fig. 1) were presented. All sto-
ries consisted of 7 pictures and told a story according to the
“Sally Anne Scenario” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). The ﬁrst
four pictures showed two children (e.g. Betty andNick) and
twoboxes (e.g. abagandabasket) in a room(picture1).One
child (e.g. Betty) puts an object into one box (e.g. a teddy-
bear into the bag; picture 2). Then Betty leaves the room
(picture 3). The other child (Nick) takes the teddy-bear out
of the bag (picture 4). These four pictures are the same in
the false- and true-belief conditions. Then the stories con-
tinue slightly differently. In the true-belief condition Betty
comes back into the room (picture 5) and watches Nick
putting the teddy into the basket (picture 6). In the false-
belief condition Nick puts the teddy-bear into the basket
while Betty is out of the room (picture 5). Then Betty comes
back into the room (picture 6). The ﬁnal picture of each
story was marked by a red frame (picture 7) and was the
same for the true and the false-belief story: Betty looks for
the teddy-bear. In order to realize a violation of expectation
task, 50% of the ﬁnal pictures showedBetty looking into the
correct boxwhile in the other 50%of cases Bettywas shown
looking into the wrong box. Although all stories depicted a
transfer of an object from one location into another loca-
tion, the objects (e.g. ball, teddy, book, toy car), the places
(e.g. cupboard, box, bag, basket) and the children differed
between the stories.
2.3. Procedure
Participants sat comfortably in a dimly lit, sound-
attenuated chamber while picture stories were presented
on a computer monitor. The pictures were 12 cm in height
and 26 cm in width and subtended a visual angle of 5.7◦
vertically and 12.4◦ horizontally. Each ERP eliciting picture
was presented for 2000ms after the presentation of a black
screen for 300ms (ISI).
The presentation of the ﬁnal picture (picture 7) which
depicted the outcome of each story was the target event
to which the ERP data were time-locked. After the offset
of the ﬁnal picture and an ISI of 300ms, a response cue
remained on the screen until the response was registered.
The response cue asked the participants “Did you think that
the child would search there?” (Hast Du gedacht, dass das
Kind da sucht?). Adults reported their decision by pressing
one of two buttons with either their left or right thumb.
‘Yes’ and ‘no’ response hands were counterbalanced across
adult participants. We separated the target picture from
the response picture to prevent motor artefacts in the tar-
get picture. The children provided their decision verbally
and the experimenter recorded their responses on a com-
puter. Forty true-belief stories and 40 false-belief stories
were presented. The task was presented in a pseudoran-
domorder. Prior to the startof theERPrecording16practice
trials were given that were different from the test trials.
During this instruction phase, stories were narrated by the
experimenter. The stimulus presentation was controlled
using C software.
70 J. Meinhardt et al. / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 67–76
4 were
umn). PFig. 1. Example of a typical true- and false-belief story: the pictures 1–
false-belief stories continue differently (picture 5 and 6, left and right col2.4. EEG/ERP recording and analysis
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded using
EasyCap electrode caps appropriately sized for the chil-
dren’s and adults’ heads. There were 6 midline electrodesthe same for the true- and false-belief stories, afterwards the true- and
icture 7 was the ERP eliciting event.(Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, Oz) and 22 left/right hemisphere
electrodes (FP1/FP2, F7/F8, F3/F4, FT7/FT8, FC3/FC4, T7/T8,
C3/C4, FP7/TP8, CP3/CP4, P7/P8, and P3/P4) according to
the International 10-20 system. The EEG was acquired
with Cz reference. The vertical electrooculogram (EOG)
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as recorded from electrodes placed above and below the
ight eye and the horizontal EOG was recorded from elec-
rodes placed at the outer canthi. The ground electrodewas
laced at position AFz. Additional electrodes were placed
n both mastoids. The impedances of all electrodes were
ept below 5k. The EEG and EOG signals were ampli-
ed by NeuroScan Synamps ampliﬁers with a bandpass
f 0.01–40Hz/−6dB and were continuously sampled at
00Hz. For all ofﬂine analyses, Vision Analyzer software
Brain Products, Germany)was used. Ofﬂine EEG datawere
e-referenced to averagemastoids, andwere digitally high-
ass ﬁltered at 0.1Hz/−12dB. Segments time-locked to
he ﬁnal picture of each story were extracted. The seg-
ents were 1100ms long for adults (−100 to 1000ms)
nd 1600ms long for children (−100 to 1500ms). A longer
poch was used with children because their ERP compo-
ents occurred at longer latencies. The 100ms interval
efore picture onset was deﬁned as the pre-stimulus base-
ine. Segmented data were scanned for artifacts in three
teps. First, segmentswere automatically eliminated if EEG
xceeded ±100V for adults or ±150V for children. Sec-
nd, segments with other artifacts that were previously
ndetected were manually excluded from the sample.
hird, segments were corrected for ocular artifacts using
he algorithm of Gratton et al. (1983). Artifact-free seg-
ents for correct responses were averaged separately for
ach participant and experimental condition. The criterion
or further processing was a minimum of 16 clean seg-
ents per belief condition among the correctly responded
rials. After artifact correction the average number of use-
ble segments in the true-belief condition amounted to
8.7 (SD=8.2) for adults and 24.8 (SD=7.2) for children.
or the false-belief condition, average number of useable
egments was 29.8 (SD=7.9) for adults and 25.3 (SD=8.5)
or children. The number of useable segments did not differ
igniﬁcantly between adults and children, F(1, 41) =3.16,
> 0.083, did not differ signiﬁcantly between the belief
onditions, F(1, 41) =1.46, p>0.23, and did not interact
etween belief and group, F(1, 41) =0.18, p>0.67.
ERPs were measured as mean area amplitudes within
peciﬁc time windows, as described below. The resulting
ata for each time window were analyzed with a 2×2×2
ixed-designed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with group
s a between subject factor (2 levels: adults and children),
elief (2 levels: true- and false-belief) and expectancy (2
evels: expected and unexpected) as repeatedmeasure fac-
ors. Three separate ANOVA analyses were performed in
rder to examine columns of scalp electrodes along the
nterior–posterior axis of the head. The midline analy-
is had six levels of the electrode site factor (Fz, FCz, Cz,
Pz, Pz, and Oz). The superior analysis had ﬁve levels of
he electrode site factor and two levels of the hemisphere
actor (F3/F4, FC3/FC4, C3/C4, CP3/CP4, and P3/P4). The
nferior analysis had six levels of the electrode site factor
nd two levels of the hemisphere factor (FP1/FP2, F7/F8,
T7/FT8, T7/T8, TP7/TP8, and P7/P8). For all analyses of
ariance (ANOVA), the Greenhouse–Geisser correction for
on-sphericity was applied to all p-values associated with
ore than one degree of freedom. The corrected p-values
nd the original degrees of freedom are reported. We con-
idered statistical signiﬁcance to be p<0.05. Because thisive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 67–76 71
report focuses on topographic interactions andnot onover-
all group differences with respect to ERP amplitudes, the
ERPdatawerenot standardized. Therefore, only the experi-
mentalmaineffects (belief andexpectancy) and interaction
effects including the main factors were reported.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioural results
Response accuracy (in percent) was analyzed by
a 2×2×2 (group×belief× expectancy) mixed-designed
ANOVA with group as a between subject factor and belief
and expectancy as a repeated measure factor. The sig-
niﬁcant main effect of group (F(1, 41) =11.49, p<0.02)
showed that adults (M=96.83, SD=2.54) were slightly
more accurate than children (M=92.22, SD=5.71). There
was no other signiﬁcant main effect or interaction. Further,
there were no signiﬁcant correlations between children’s
age and accuracy on true-belief tasks or on false-belief
tasks (all ps >0.19). On the basis of the accuracy data it
can be assumed that both groups performed the task in
a controlled fashion and that developmental differences
between children and adults are not related to differences
in the understanding of true and false beliefs.
3.2. ERP results
For the analysis of the ERP data, only trials with correct
responses were included. The grand average waveforms
elicited in the true- and false-belief conditions are shown
in Fig. 2 for adults and children for selected electrodes.
Visual inspection revealed that in adults and children both
conditions elicited a comparable sequence of early and
late waveforms. As expected from developmental ERP data
for children the overall amplitude of the waveforms were
greater and the latencies of some components were later
than for adults. A differentiation between the true- and
false-belief condition was predominantly pronounced in
two waveforms: the ﬁrst deﬂection – a late positive com-
plex (LPC) – was most pronounced at parietal regions.
With respect to latency and the posterior scalp distribution
this waveform might be a P3-like component. For statis-
tical analysis the mean amplitudes in a time window of
300–600ms were extracted for adults and children. The
LPC was followed by a late slow wave (LSW) divergence
at anterior regions. This LSW showed a longer duration
in time for children than for adults. Therefore, for adults
the mean amplitude values were extracted between 600
and 900ms and for children between 750 and 1450ms.
These time windows were determined by using mean sep-
arate grand averages for children and adults in true- and
false-belief conditions. The grand average ERPs in adults
and children for true- and false-belief reasoning are shown
in Fig. 2 and the topographic maps of the belief effect are
shown in Fig. 3 for the LPC and LSW.3.2.1. Belief effect
During theLPCepoch (adults andchildren:300–600ms)
false-belief tasks elicit signiﬁcantly more positive wave-
forms than true-belief tasks at midline (main effect of
72 J. Meinhardt et al. / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 67–76
Fig. 2. Grand average ERPs in adults and children: ERPs are elicited by the ﬁnal picture in the true-belief and false-belief condition at frontal and parietal
electrode locations.
Fig. 3. Topographicmapsof thebelief effect:meanamplitudedifferencebetweenERPsof the true-belief condition subtracted fromthe false-belief condition
separated for adults and children. The LPC represents the 300–600ms post-stimulus epoch for adults and for children. The LSW represents the 600–900ms
post-stimulus epoch for adults and the 750–1450ms post-stimulus epoch for children.
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elief: F(1, 41) =28.43, p<0.001), superior (main effect of
elief: F(1, 41) =30.52, p<0.001), and inferior sites (main
ffect of belief: F(1, 41) =8.24, p<0.006).
False-belief tasks continued to elicit signiﬁcantly more
ositive waveforms than true-belief tasks during the LSW
poch (adults: 600–900, children: 750–1450ms) atmidline
main effect of belief: F(1, 41) =20.01, p<0.001), superior
main effect of belief: F(1, 41) =13.76, p<0.001), and infe-
ior sites (main effect of belief: F(1,41) =9.65, p<0.003).
he belief effect was most expressed over anterior regions
s indicated by the belief by electrode site interaction at
idline sites, F(5, 205) =7.55, p<0.001, superior sites, F(4,
64) =4.84, p<0.009, and inferior sites, F(5, 205) =3.36,
< 0.028.
.2.2. Expectancy effect
For the LPC the factor expectation showed a signiﬁ-
ant main effect at midline sites, F(1, 41) =8.97, p<0.005).
nexpected story outcomes elicited more positive wave-
orms than expected story outcomes. No reliable effect for
xpectancy was obtained for the LSW epoch.
.2.3. Developmental effect
Additionally, results indicated a developmental effect
or the LPC and the LSW.
During the LPC epoch for adults the belief effect was
idely distributed over central sites, whereas in children
he differentiation between true- and false-belief reason-
ng was more pronounced at posterior sites, as indicated
y the signiﬁcant group by belief by electrode site inter-
ction at inferior sites, F(5, 205) =8.20, p<0.001. See Fig. 2
or the waveforms and Fig. 3 for the topographic maps (left
olumn).
The results of the LSW revealed a signiﬁcant group by
elief interaction, F(1, 41) =5.14, p<0.029, and indicated
different scalp distribution for the belief effect between
oth groups. To further conﬁrm this effect, a subsidiary
nalysis with factor belief was separately conducted for
ach group at inferior sites. For children the main effect of
elief, F(1, 21) =8.17, p<0.009 and the belief by electrode
site interaction, F(5, 105) =3.48, p<0.028, were signiﬁcant.
In contrast for adults neither a main effect of belief nor
an interaction of belief with any other factor was obtained
(all ps >0.15). These results indicate that the scalp distri-
bution of the belief effect was more diffuse for children
encompassing the anterior regions atmidline, superior and
inferior sites than the belief effect for adults which was
restricted to the anterior regions at midline and superior
sites. See Fig. 2 for the waveforms and Fig. 3 for the topo-
raphic maps (right column).
. Discussion
The present study investigated ERPs that distinguish
etween false- and true-belief reasoning in children and
dults. Following a well-established paradigm in Devel-
pmental Psychology we compared false- and true-belief
easoning in parallel tasks by presenting cartoon stories
hat depicted an unexpected transfer task (Perner, 1991;
ellman et al., 2001). Both conditions required action
xplanation, but in contrast to the true-belief condition,ive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 67–76 73
false-belief reasoning additionally requires the represen-
tation of a person’s mental state independently of reality.
Thus, the present ﬁndings provide evidence on the speciﬁc
neural response associated with the decoupling mecha-
nism that is critical for false-belief understanding.
The ﬁndings provide two waveforms that distinguish
between false- and true-belief reasoning: a late positive
complex (LPC) and a late anterior slow wave (LSW), both
showing higher positive amplitudes for false- than true-
belief reasoning. Additionally, the results indicate that both
waveforms show developmental effects.
With respect to latency and the posterior scalp distri-
bution, the LPC showed similarities with a P3 potential
(Donchin and Coles, 1988; Polich, 2007). Besides being
associated with neural generators in frontal areas, the P3
component is associated with activity in the temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ;Kirinoet al., 2000;Knight et al., 1989;
Polich, 2007), an area that is often found in neuroimag-
ing studies that have investigated belief reasoning (Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003; Sommer et al., 2007). The impor-
tant role of the TPJ in false-belief reasoning is supported
by an fMRI study with adults that used the same stim-
uli as the present study and that also contrasted false-
and true-belief reasoning (Sommer et al., 2007). This study
revealed that false-belief reasoning induced signiﬁcantly
higher activity in the right TPJ than true-belief reason-
ing. The involvement of the TPJ in false-belief reasoning
is consistent with theories that discussed the TPJ as part
of the ventral attentional system (Corbetta et al., 2008)
which detects salient and behaviourally relevant stimuli
in the environment. Unlike in the true-belief condition, in
the false-belief condition differences between the subject’s
own knowledge and the protagonist’s knowledge need to
be considered. The subjects had to shift attention from the
observedprotagonist’s behaviour to their knowledge about
the protagonist’s mental representation. Attention signals
in the TPJ may be important for the reorientation from
the visual input (i.e. the protagonist’s search of the object)
to the protagonist’s mental representation (Mitchell,
2008).
These assumptions are also compatible with the
context-updating hypothesis suggesting that the P3 com-
ponent represents the process invoked when one needs
to update a mental model of the environment. Also, this
process may be depicted by the fact that a larger ampli-
tude of the P3 is related to a larger change in the mental
model (Donchin and Coles, 1988). In the true-belief con-
dition the observer’s knowledge about the protagonist’s
mental representation and the knowledge about reality
do not differ and therefore no update is required. In the
false-belief condition, the observer’s memory needs to
hold two different mental models: knowledge of where
the object really is and knowledge about the protago-
nist’s mental representation of the object’s location. The
judgment about the protagonist’s behaviour may induce
a comparison process that evaluates both mental models
and eventually demands a revision of one of these mental
models.
In addition to the results of the LPC concerning the belief
effect, the LPC also distinguished between expected and
unexpectedevents. The amplitudeof the LPCwasenhanced
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in response to unexpected endings compared to expected
endings. This result supported the interpretation of the LPC
with respect to the context update hypothesis.
Following the LPC, the late anterior slow wave (LSW)
was associated with belief reasoning in adults and also in
children. These results are in line with other ERP studies
that founda late anterior slowwaveassociatedwithmental
state attribution (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004,
2009b). Nevertheless, there is a difference in slow wave
polarity between the studies. Consistent with Sabbagh and
Taylor (2000), in the present study false-belief reasoning
was associated with a more positive slow wave. In con-
trast, in the two cartoon studies a more negative waveform
related to general belief reasoning was found (Liu et al.,
2004, 2009b). These differences in polarity may be due to
the use of different mentalizing tasks contrasting different
conditions. The present study and the study of Sabbagh and
Taylor (2000) investigated the speciﬁcityof false-belief rea-
soning. Sabbagh and Taylor (2000) contrasted a false-belief
condition with a false photo condition to identify ERP com-
ponents that distinguish between mental and non-mental
representations in adults. The present study focussed on
ERP components associated with the decoupling mech-
anism of false-belief reasoning by comparing false and
true beliefs. In both conditions participants had to explain
another person’s behaviour, but false-belief reasoning in
contrast to true-belief reasoning requires the representa-
tion of a person’s mental state independent of reality. In
contrast, by comparing mental judgements that involved
false and true beliefs with reality judgements, Liu et al.
(2004, 2009b) did not investigate the core aspect of false-
belief reasoning, thedecouplingbetweenmental states and
reality. In sum, the results of the different ERP studies indi-
cate that a positive LSWmaybe speciﬁcally associatedwith
false-belief reasoning, whereas more general mental state
attribution processes seem to be associatedwith a negative
LSW which conﬁrm the critical role of the prefrontal cortex
for belief reasoning (Frith and Frith, 2006; Sommer et al.,
2007).
Slow positive potentials over frontal areas seem to be
related to conceptual load (Rösler and Heil, 1991; Pauli
et al., 1994). In true-belief stories it sufﬁces to compare
the outcome of the story (where the children search for
the object) to reality (where the object really is). But in
the false-belief condition participants had to reason about
the protagonist’s mental representation about the object’s
location independently of the real location of the object.
The anterior slow wave may index the conceptual load
associated with the decoupling between the protagonist’s
mental representation and the real state of affairs (Liu et
al., 2004). The assumption that the late anterior slow wave
represents cognitive processes that involve the processing
of mental states independently of reality is underscored by
our fMRI study that used the same stimuli as the present
study (Sommer et al., 2007). Besides activity of the right
TPJ, the neuroimaging results revealed involvement of the
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the lateral prefrontal
cortex, areas that are involved in stimulus-independent
cognitive processes and in switching attention between
stimulus-dependent and stimulus independent thought
processes (Gilbert et al., 2006).ive Neuroscience 1 (2011) 67–76
Taken together, the current ﬁndings showed two late
waveforms, the LPC and the LSW, that distinguished
between true- and false-belief reasoning. These late poten-
tials are more likely associated with controlled than with
automatic processing. In contrast to modularity theory
that proposes that mental operations associated with ToM
processes are executed in a fast automatic mode with
perception-like speed (Leslie, 1994), the present results
indicate a more controlled processing of beliefs. There-
fore, consistent with previous ERP studies (Liu et al., 2004;
Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000), our results provide further evi-
dence against the idea that belief reasoning is performed
in an automatic manner with perception-like speed.
Interestingly, our results revealed not only an inﬂuence
of true- and false-belief reasoning on the LPC and the LSW,
but also an effect of development on both components.
In adults, the LPC divergence showed a broad distribu-
tion with a focus on central sites whereas in children, the
LPC was broader distributed at posterior regions. The LSW
showed a broader scalp distribution at frontal regions for
children than for adults. In adults, the late anterior slow
wave distinguished true- and false-belief reasoning atmid-
line and superior regions whereas for children the LSW
divergence encompassed midline, superior and also infe-
rior sites.
The broader scalp distribution of the LSW expands Liu’s
et al. (2009b) ﬁndings that also showed a broader distribu-
tion of the children’s LSW in a belief–reality contrast and
indicates developmental effects especially associated with
false-belief reasoning.
The differences in the topography between children
and adults may be associated with developmental changes
of the brain. During childhood and adolescence the brain
undergoes substantial structural changes (Blakemore,
2008a,b; Giedd et al., 1999; Huttenlocher and Dabholkar,
1997; Shaw et al., 2008). Research showed that especially
areas of the frontal cortex, but also of the temporal and
parietal cortex show changes in grey- and white-matter
volume. Possibly, the different distribution patterns of the
LPC and the late anterior slow wave mirror the develop-
mental progression in cortical areas. Johnson (2001) argues
that changes in the response properties of cortical regions
during development are determined by their connectivity
to other regions and their current activity status. Therefore,
behavioural abilities that do not differ between children
and adults may be associated with different patterns of
cortical activation. This suggestion is supported by devel-
opmental studies that observe less localized ERP activity
in children than in adults (Johnson and Munakata, 2005)
and also by functional neuroimaging studies of social cog-
nition that revealed activity increase in the medial PFC
between childhood and adulthood (Blakemore, 2008a,b).
Also, these topographical differences may reﬂect different
cognitive strategies for solving false-belief tasks. Children,
who are able to solve ﬁrst order false-belief tasks, still
lack the conceptual repertoire of advanced ToM reasoning.
Moreover, adults have ahuge advantage in experiencewith
false-belief situations. Therefore it is possible that children
recruit divergent, and more cumbersome cognitive strate-
gies and need more effort for solving false-belief tasks than
adults. This idea is also supported by the observation that
l Cognit
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ompared to adults children’s LSW showed a longer dura-
ion in time. Since the temporal extensionof theLSWreﬂect
he duration of the cognitive process, thismay indicate that
hildren take longer to process another person’s mental
tate.
As can be derived from the time windows for the sta-
istical analysis, the LSW evoked later in children than in
dults. The latency shift is consistent with a general age-
elated change in the latency of ERP components and has
een demonstrated over a wide range of cognitive func-
ions and different ERP components (Taylor and Baldeweg,
002). The current ﬁndings expand these results to false-
elief reasoning. An age-related latency shift may reﬂect
he development of faster information processing through-
ut childhood (Kail, 1991) andmaybe related to a variety of
aturational factors such as synaptic density, skull thick-
ning and brain size (DeBoer et al., 2004). The latency shift
f the late anterior slow wave in contrast to the LPC may
ndicate that especially the late anterior slow wave was
ffected by these factors.
. Conclusion
Results revealed two ERPs that distinguished between
rue- and false-belief reasoning in children and adults:
late positive complex (LPC) most expressed at parietal
egions and a late anterior slow wave (LSW). Considering
hese ERPs,wepropose two cognitive steps associatedwith
he decoupling mechanism of false-belief reasoning. The
PC may reﬂect attention signals for the reorientation from
xternal stimuli to internal mental representations, fol-
owed by the LSW thatmay indicate the processing of these
nternal mental representations independent of external
timuli. Thegreater amplitudeof theERPcomponents asso-
iated with false-belief reasoning may indicate a higher
ognitive load imposed on these computational steps.
Additionally, results revealed a developmental effect in
he topography of the ERPs. The topographic differences
etween children and adults support the idea that the cor-
ical mentalizing network continues to develop even after
hildren are able to master false-belief tasks (Blakemore
t al., 2007). These differences may reﬂect the develop-
ental structural changes that the brain undergoes during
hildhood, which in turn is correlated with developmental
rogress in conceptualizing the mental domain (Johnson
nd Munakata, 2005) as well as progress in the fast and
ccurate processing of belief-relevant information.
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